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1 Introduction 
 
The past decades have been subject to a formidable development in the area of international law 
and international human rights law. Traditionally, only states were deemed as subjects of 
international law, but with the increasing globalization also non-state actors have proved to be of 
importance in the international sphere, especially in the context of human rights. Hence, the 
assumption that only the state itself and its agents are accountable for human rights abuses is 
frequently challenged
1
. The question of whether non-state actors such as corporations have gained 
status as subjects of international law has created vigorous debates, although it is indisputable that 
multinational corporations may have a considerable impact on human rights, both as protectors and 
violators of internationally recognized rights. The aim of this article is, nevertheless, not to 
determine whether corporations are independent subjects of international law and if they thus hold 
legal duties and responsibilities. The purpose is to attempt to provide an overview of the current 
conditions of the doctrine of state responsibility as an instrument to address and protect human 
rights violations committed by non-state actors, particularly multinational corporations. Through 
the upcoming analysis it will be considered if this doctrine is adequate to effectively address 
breaches of international human rights law, or if supplementary instruments are required, for 
instance the preparation of legal frameworks which are directly applicable to non-state actors. In 
addition to the traditional doctrine also the principle of due diligence, which is one of the primary 
obligations of states in the area of human rights law, will be examined to determine if state 
responsibility can be invoked as a result of a state’s omission to prevent internationally unlawful 
private conduct. Consequently, the central topic of discussion is the responsibilities of governments 
for unlawful corporate activity. In this context also a few fundamental principles of international 
law need to be explored, among others the general rules of state responsibility and the principles of 
jurisdiction.  
 
2 State Responsibility for Breaches of International Obligations Committed by Non-
State Actors 
 
2.1 The International Rules on State Responsibility 
 
In the current state of international law and international human rights law it is generally 
acknowledged that there are two broad principles from which state responsibility is derived, that is  
 
                                                
1
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a) the doctrine of attribution or imputability, which affirms that states are responsible for acts or 
omissions committed by individuals while exercising the state’s power and authority. These 
actions are attributed to the state even if the acts exceeds the authority granted by the state (ultra 
vires acts), and 
b) the doctrine of due diligence, from which acts or omissions of non-state actors which are 
generally not attributable to the state, may nevertheless lead to state responsibility if the state fails 
to exercise the necessary due diligence in preventing or reacting to such acts or omissions.  
 
The two different principles have been referred to as direct and indirect responsibility, however, 
such a description may be misleading, and a more correct definition are responsibility by attribution 
and responsibility due to failure to exercise due diligence. Both of these contemporary doctrines can 
be applied in regards to the question of when subjects of international law are to be held responsible 
for actions committed by non-state actors, such as individuals and corporations. In the next sections 
the traditional law of state responsibility will primarily be examined, followed by a discussion in 
regards to the doctrine of due diligence which is derived from a state’s primary duty to protect to 
protect human rights, and the general rules of attribution of conduct to a state on the basis of the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts (hereafter referred to as the ILC Articles).   
 
2.1.1 The Doctrine of State Responsibility 
 
The traditional law of state responsibility, a fundamental principle of international law, consisted 
primarily of customary rules, which developed out of state practice and the nature of the 
international legal system. These rules established responsibility for breaches of international 
obligations, and consequently the obligation of the state to make reparations for the breach. 
However, there is one major problem under this doctrine, which is that it for a long time has been 
under-developed under international law. The main reason being the conflicting interests between 
state responsibility and the doctrine of state sovereignty, which emphasizes the formal equality of 
states. In addition the problems of the voluntary character of international law that requires state 
consent to establish legally binding instruments, have limited and slowed the development of the 
doctrine of state responsibility. The current scope of state responsibility is mainly influenced by the 
works of the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC), which, after several years of 
research, in 2001 adopted the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. The articles, as the main legal source within this area of law, reflect both customary 
international law, and in some areas it has progressively developed the law of state responsibility. 
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On the other hand, it is not a treaty, and therefore not a binding instrument of law, which is binding 
upon states as such. Nevertheless, the articles have been quoted by the International Court of Justice 
in its jurisprudence; hence it can be regarded as an important source of law. The progressive 
development includes, among others, the now acknowledged distinction between primary and 
secondary rules of international law, and the clarification of the question of the fault requirement
2
. 
The secondary rules of state responsibility is explained as “the general conditions under 
international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and 
the legal consequences which flow therefrom”
3
, while the primary rules “defines the content of the 
international obligations breach of which gives rise to responsibility”. The ILC Articles consist of 
secondary rules of state responsibility.  
 
A general issue within the doctrine of state responsibility is when, and on what conditions, 
responsibility accrues. Basically, the doctrine is based upon the connection between the state and 
the person or persons actually executing the wrongful act or omission. For responsibility to arise the 
connection has to be sufficiently strong so that the unlawful act may be imputed to the state. The 
question of imputability has been clarified by the ILC Articles. For a wrongful act to occur, two 
components have to be established. These components consist of both subjective and objective 
elements. The subjective element is the imputability to a state of action or omission - that the 
unlawful breach can be assigned to the state actor, while the objective element is the inconsistency 
of the particular conduct with an international obligation, which is binding upon that state, i.e. the 
execution of an unlawful act. In this context difficulties arise more often in regards to the 
requirement of imputability, which is often hard to establish. The question is basically whether the 
breach was committed by the state itself, or by other actors which were under the sufficient control, 
instruction or authority of the state.  
 
A state as an abstract legal entity cannot act ‘itself’, but acts through individuals. For the state to be 
responsible for such acts, it is necessary to establish whether the act in question may be attributed to 
it. Traditionally the individual committing the acts had to be acting as a state official under the 
particular state. This was held by the International Court of Justice in Immunity from Legal Process 
of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights
4
 where it stated that “according to a 
well-established rule of international law [of customary character] the conduct of any organ of a 
State must be regarded as an act of that State”
5
. On the other hand, also acts of individuals without 
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the formal status of state officials may be attributed to the state. Such attribution was recognized by 
the International Court of Justice in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States)
6
 where it was confirmed that actions of individuals 
under ‘the effective control’ of a state could be imputed to the state, and thus incur state 
responsibility. The Court later upheld that article 8 of the ILC Articles envisaged that if individuals 
acted under the instruction, direction or control of a state, imputability to the state could be justified. 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber (International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991) also applied this test in its judgment in Tadic
7
. These 
standards were accepted by the ILC in the ILC Articles as means of imputability, which could 
hence establish state responsibility. Under these rules responsibility accrues for actions and 
omissions of state organs and officials, even when committed outside the scope of its apparent 
authority, in other words, also acts committed ultra vires may be attributed to the state. Hence, if the 
act or omission is imputable to the state and there has in fact been a violation of an international 
obligation, either of customary law or of a treaty obligation, the state is internationally responsible 
for those violations. In practice the test of attribution makes it hard to prove responsibility for acts 
committed by individuals, and some have argued that there is currently a too high threshold for 
establishing state responsibility. The rules of attribution will be further discussed under 2.2.1.  
 
2.1.2 The Relationship between International Human Rights and State Responsibility 
 
As already mentioned, state responsibility will incur under customary international law where an 
internationally unlawful act, either a positive act or an omission, can be attributed to the state. This 
position is recognized by various international tribunals, i.e. in the cases of Caire Case (France v 
Mexico)
8
 and Thomas H. Youmans (USA) v United Mexican States
9
. The applicability of these rules 
to international human rights law is generally accepted - a position, which is supported by the ILC 
Articles and its commentaries. Article 12 expressly states that the breach of an international 
obligation occurs where state action “is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character”
10
. The Commentary does not define the primary 
rules of international law, which is the contents of the obligations, but rather the secondary rules, 
which is on what conditions responsibility may arise. This distinction indicates that the law of state 
                                                6 I.C.J.Rep 1984. 7
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8
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9
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responsibility is applicable also to human rights law
11
. The relationship between the primary and 
secondary rules of state responsibility may further entail that the ILC Articles applies to all 
international obligations of states, without regard to whether the obligation in question is owed to 
another state, private persons or towards the international community as a whole. Moreover, the 
Commentary to the Articles expressly specifies that the parts of the Articles concerning legal 
consequences and implementation are not applicable to human rights obligations. The Commentary 
affirms that “State responsibility extends, for example, to human rights violations and other 
breaches of international law where the primary beneficiary of the obligation breached is not a 
State. However, while Part One [regarding the wrongful act and attribution] applies to all the cases 
in which an internationally wrongful act may be committed by a State, Part Two has a more limited 
scope”
12
. This statement implicates that the doctrine of state responsibility is applicable to 
international human rights law. The International Court of Justice has also adopted a similar point 
of view in its judgments. In Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France)
13
 the Court held that “any 
violation by a state of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to state responsibility”, a 
statement which was subsequently repeated in Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary v 
Slovenia)
14
. As well jurisprudence from the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) is in 
conformity with this conception
15
. Hence, according to international jurisprudence and the ILC 
Articles, one can assert that a breach of international human rights obligations may give rise state 
responsibility. However, there is one important limitation of the applicability of state responsibility 
to human rights violations - that is the element of attribution of the unlawful act to the state. A 
connection between the state and the unlawful conduct has to be proven, which, in this particular 
area of law, may give rise to major difficulties because of the emergence of non-state actors. 
Traditionally, if human rights violations cannot be said to constitute state action and hence cannot 
be attributed to the state, international responsibility will not occur. Yet, as also omissions of state 
organs may invoke state responsibility, one may ask if the omission of a state to protect human 
rights can additionally give rise to such responsibility.  
 
2.1.2.1 The Duty to Protect Human Rights 
 
It is generally recognized that international human rights law imposes certain obligations which 
states are bound to respect. Through the ratification of international human rights treaties, state 
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parties agree upon three important levels of duties. Those are the duties to respect, protect and 
fulfill human rights. In this context focus will be upon the duty to protect. According to the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) the duty to protect 
“requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses”
16
. It additionally 
indicates the necessity of state parties taking positive measures to give effect to the treaty rights. An 
important question is how wide the scope of this duty should be defined, and whether or not it 
covers the conduct of non-state entities. By virtue of becoming member states to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), state parties are according to article 2 obliged to 
“respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the Covenant”. The provisions of the ICCPR suggest that the duty to ensure imposes 
on states an obligation to take positive steps to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights, and thus, 
to take measures to prevent human rights violations committed by private actors. In addition, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicated that the duty to protect is also 
applicable to the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, and hence that state 
parties are obliged to preclude violations of treaty rights by non-state actors. Consequently, one 
may say that the duty to protect implicitly encompasses a state obligation to control and regulate 
non-state actors; the Human Rights Committee for instance asserts this
17
. Moreover, this position is 
supported and adopted by other international human rights instruments, for example by the 
European
18
 and the American Conventions on Human Rights
19
. Also the Commentary to the ILC 
Articles may clarify this question, while it says that “a State may be responsible for the effects of 
the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take necessary measures to prevent those effects”
20
. 
Accordingly, the conclusion is that there is a well established notion in international law that it is an 
obligation of states to protect individuals within their jurisdictions from human rights violations by 
private actors, and that this duty applies both to civil and political, as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights. It is therefore the omission of protection which, on this ground, will invoke 
responsibility for private acts, and, as already established under 1.1.1., article 2 of the ILC Articles 
covers both positive acts and omissions as grounds for state responsibility.  
 
Nevertheless, the obligation to protect human rights must be seen in the context of the so-called due 
diligence test, as a legally binding obligation on a state to protect the human rights of all individuals 
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within its jurisdiction would clearly be too extensive
21
. If a general duty to protect human rights was 
established, the state would be responsible for all human rights violations which occurred within its 
private sphere, a position which would take the doctrine of state responsibility too far. The due 
diligence test was first articulated in Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras
22
, a judgment by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. The Court here confirmed that “an illegal act which violates 
human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State”, i.e. because it was committed 
by a non-state actor, “can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act 
itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required 
by the Convention”. Ergo, the Court saw it as its task to determine whether violations were the 
result of the state’s failure to fulfill its duty to respect and guarantee convention rights. Yet the mere 
existence of a violation was not adequate to prove the failure to take preventive measures and 
accordingly invoke state responsibility, but the state is obliged to ‘take reasonable steps to prevent 
human rights violations’. The due diligence test was later adopted by the African Commission on 
Human Rights, while it has expressly referred to Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras and the 
requirement of a state taking positive action in fulfilling human rights obligations. It is further 
argued that also the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the concept of due diligence, 
for example in X and Y v Netherlands, where the Court proclaimed that state authorities were 
obliged to take steps to ensure that the enjoyment of rights were not interfered with by any other 
private person
23
. Additionally, in Osman v United Kingdom the Court held that article 2 (1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (regarding the right to life) had to be interpreted as to 
impose on the state “to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction”
24
. The key issue in this jurisprudence is the ‘reasonableness’ of the measures taken to 
prevent human rights abuses. The measures taken have to be reasonable according to the alleged 
risk and the difficulties regarding the prevention of them. Thus, if the state has undertaken 
reasonable preventive measures to avoid possible human rights abuses, state responsibility will not 
accrue. The due diligence test has subsequently been increasingly recognized in the international 
sphere. Article 4 (c) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women recommends 
states to ‘exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, 
punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private 
persons’, while the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
25
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insists that ‘failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the behavior of such non-state actors’ 
leads to state responsibility.  
 
Consequently, the scope of the duty to protect cannot be interpreted so broadly as to hold a state 
responsible for all human rights violations within its jurisdiction. International responsibility will 
thus occur when a state has failed to exercise reasonable due diligence to prevent human rights 
violations committed by non-state actors. Here state responsibility accrue for conduct initially not 
attributable to the state, on the ground of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violating acts. The 
omission of protecting individuals and regulating other non-state actors will accordingly constitute 
the breach of an international obligation, a breach that is committed by the state and therefore 
attributable to it. This position was emphasized and supported in D. Earnshaw and Others (Great 
Britain) v United States (Zafiro case)
26
 where it was implied that responsibility will not incur for 
wholly private acts, but the failure to prevent such acts may entail international responsibility of the 
state.  
 
2.2 State Responsibility for Private Acts or Omissions 
 
As already established under 2.1.2., the doctrine of state responsibility is applicable to international 
human rights law, thus, the breach of a human rights obligation of a state may entail the 
international responsibility of that state. Furthermore, as the duty to protect encompasses an 
obligation to prevent abuses within the state’s jurisdiction by non-state actors, the conclusion is that 
the miscarriage of such an obligation can result in the state being held indirectly responsible for 
private acts. In traditional international law, as alleged above, and also in human rights law which 
cannot be said to impose the duty to protect, there has to be proof of state action for state 
responsibility to occur, that is, the particular violating act must be attributable to the state. 
 
2.2.1 Attribution of Conduct to a State 
 
According to the current traditional regulation of state responsibility two essential conditions have 
to be established for such responsibility to arise; that is the objective element of a breach of a 
formal legal obligation by one state owed to another state, and secondly, the subjective element of 
imputability to the first state of the unlawful conduct, as codified in article 2 of the ILC Articles. 
The proposition found in article 2 is one of the fundamental structures of the general law of state 
responsibility, and several judgments of international tribunals have implicitly provided support for 
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this principle. The Tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
expressly referred to the two conditions of imputability in Total S.A v Argentine Republic
27
 and it 
accordingly observed that “as held by the ILC these two conditions are sufficient to establish such a 
wrongful act giving rise to international responsibility. Having caused damage is not an additional 
requirement, except if the content of the primary obligation breached has an object or implies an 
obligation not to cause damages”. Also the International Court of Justice has adopted article 2 as 
means of imputability. In its decision in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) it clearly 
approves of the two conditions set out it the ILC Articles by referring to “the well-established rule, 
one of the cornerstones of the law of State responsibility, that the conduct of any State organ is to 
be considered an act of the State under international law, and therefore gives rise to the 




Chapter II of the ILC Articles further determines on which conditions attribution is justified. Its 
commentary declares that “in theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations or collectivities 
linked to the State by nationality, habitual residence or incorporation might be attributed to the 
State”, although this approach is avoided because the recognition of the autonomy of individuals is 
desirable. Ergo, “the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the international 
level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation 
or control of those organs”
29
. Consequently, private actions or omissions are generally not 
attributable to the state. The question of imputability is in reality an empirical problem, where it has 
to be considered whether the breach actually was committed by the state “itself”. As the state is an 
abstract entity, which cannot act itself, there are two options; the unlawful act was performed by 
official state organs, or by non-state actors (i.e. individuals, enterprises and non-governmental 
organizations). In Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran that concerned activities of state organs, the 
Court stated that it is “generally accepted in international law that a State is also responsible for acts 
of persons, if it is established that those persons were in fact acting on behalf of the State”
30
. 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that international law is of importance when deciding what 
constitutes an organ of a state. For instance, a state cannot avoid international responsibility by 
simply claiming that a department is a separate legal entity according to domestic law. Yeager v 
Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized this while stating that “attributability of acts to the State is not 
limited to acts of organs formally recognized under international law. Otherwise a State could avoid 
                                                
27
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responsibility under international law merely by invoking its internal law”
31
. The Commentary to 
the ILC Articles (Chapter II) supports this point of view in saying that state responsibility can arise 
“for the conduct of all the organs, instrumentalities and officials which form part of its organization 
and act in that capacity, whether or not they have separate legal personality under its internal 
law”
32
. However, as stated by the International Court of Justice in Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro)
33
, “to equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status 
under internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particular great degree of State 
control over them, [...] expressly described as ‘complete dependence’’.  
 
The ILC Articles Chapter II defines under which circumstances conduct may be attributed to the 
state. It consists of eight different articles where articles 4 to 7 deals with general rules of 
attribution, while articles 8 to 11 consist of additional rules where actions committed by non-state 
organs or entities may nonetheless be imputed to the state. Circumstances which are not covered by 
this chapter are in general not attributable to the state, and thus, do not lead to responsibility. 
Anyhow, the duty to protect human rights and the responsibility, which may accrue by failure to do 
so, can be regarded as an exception to the traditional rules of imputability. The first principle of 
attribution is found in article 4, which also may be regarded as the basic rule in this area of law. It 
confirms that any conduct of the organs of a state shall be considered an act of that state. Moreover, 
the International Court of Justice held in Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights
34
 that this rule can be considered as customary international law. 
The following seven articles impose responsibility for conduct of persons or entities exercising 
elements of governmental authority (article 5), conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a state by 
another state (article 6), ultra vires act by state organs (article 7), conduct directed or controlled by a 
state (Article 8), conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities (article 9), 
conduct of an insurrectional or other movement (article 10), and conduct acknowledged and 
adopted by a state as its own (article 11). One of the relevant articles for this purpose - attribution of 
acts committed by non-state actors - is article 8 and conduct directed or controlled by a state. It has 
been argued that even if conduct is not attributable to a state because the actor did not constitute a 
state organ according to article 4, then conduct may nonetheless be imputed to the state if the actor 
acted under the instruction, authority or control of that state under article 8.  
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Non-state actors are traditionally not bound by international legal obligations, such as international 
treaties, customary international law or general principles of law. In the international sphere states 
are the primary subjects, but also non-state actors can violate international obligations, especially 
human rights. Because non-state actors generally cannot be held directly responsible for breaches of 
international law, there must be an effective system of attributing such unlawful acts to their home 
states. Article 8, which according to the International Court of Justice must be regarded as 
customary international law (in Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)), says that ‘the conduct 
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, that State in carrying out the conduct’. The conduct of private persons and enterprises may under 
this article be imputed to the state. For responsibility to arise there must however be a factual link 
between the actor and the state
35
. This link can be established in two different circumstances; a) 
where the actor acted on the instructions of the state, and b) where it acted under the state’s 
direction or control. International jurisprudence has also widely accepted the first option, that is, 
authorized conduct as a basis for imputability. It is not important whether the actor was a private 
individual or if the conduct involved governmental activity - conduct may still be attributed to the 
state if the factual relationship is verified. The second option, whether the non-state entity acted 
under the state’s direction or control, is more difficult to determine. Here the factual link has to be 
stronger and more evident
36
, and attribution of wrongful acts is only justified where the state 
directed or controlled the specific operation in question. It has been argued that it is currently too 
difficult to establish the degree of control required. Two different tests have been emphasized. The 
first test was put forward by the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) where the Court 
concluded that for state responsibility to arise “it would in principle have to be proved that that 
State had effective control”
37
 of the abusive operations committed. The ICTY Chamber on the other 
hand, laid down the second test in its judgment in Tadic, that is, the “overall control” test. The 
Chamber in Tadic accentuated that the degree of control could vary according to the specific 
circumstances of different cases, and that it could not “see why in each and every circumstance 
international law should require a high threshold for the test of control”
38
, hence, it criticized the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua and the effective control test. But also 
the ‘overall control’ test has been criticized, although recent state practice has provided support for 
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the Tadic decision
39
. It was for instance noted in Application of the Convention of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) that 
the test had “the major drawback of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the 
fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility ... a State’s responsibility 
can be incurred for acts committed by persons or groups of persons - neither State organs nor to be 
equated with such organs - only if, assuming those acts to be internationally wrongful, they are 
attributable to it under the rule of customary international law reflected in Article 8 ... In this regard 
the ‘overall control’ test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the 
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international 
responsibility”
40
. Thus, the Court adopted the “effective control” test, and it further determined that 
it also could be regarded as customary international law
41
. As aforementioned under 2.1.1 the test of 
“effective control” has been criticized for upholding an overly high threshold for recognizing 
sufficient state control of the non-state actor. In its judgment in Ilascu v Moldova and Russia, the 
European Court of Human Rights applied a less strict test for establishing the sufficient control. The 
Court found that a Moldovian separatist regime was “under the effective authority, or at the very 
least the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation”
42
, and this was considered an adequate 
degree of control even though it was not determined whether the Russian Federation was in 
effective control of the region in question. The conduct of the separatist regime was attributable to 
Russia. It is argued that the Court hereby indicated that neither a high degree of effective control or 
general control of the territory in question are required to attribute actions committed by non-state 
actors outside a state’s territory to the state. Hence, a state party to the European Convention on 




Nonetheless, as stated in the ILC Commentary, the conclusion is that where a non-state actor (i.e. 
individual or corporation) is acting under the instructions, directions or control of a state and 
simultaneously violate international law, its actions may be imputed to the state. Ergo, state 
responsibility for breaches of international law committed by a non-state actor may be established, 
provided the necessary factual link between the state and the non-state actor. But, as will be 
discussed later, also additional rules under the ILC Articles may be utilized as means to invoke state 
responsibility due to private acts.  
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3 Home State Responsibility and Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations 
Committed by Multinational Corporations 
 
3.1 The Meanings of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 
It is a defining feature of international law that it aims to protect the territorial integrity of the 
sovereign state
44
. Thus, one of the fundamental principles of international law is the principle of 
state sovereignty. The principle provides for the rule that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
another state’s territory unless international rules have established an exception. This doctrine of 
sovereignty is closely linked to the principle of non-intervention, which says that a state does not 
have the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of other states. Both of these principles 
are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the former in Article 2.1 and the latter in Article 
2.7. They are both well-established essential principles of traditional international law, and they 
confirm that the general basis for jurisdiction is domestic and limited to territorial boundaries; the 
so-called territoriality principle or the principle of domestic jurisdiction. In the domestic legal 
sphere jurisdiction is defined as the power of a state to govern persons, property and events by its 
municipal law and through its legal instruments
45
, that is, territorial jurisdiction. The leading case 
affirming the principle of territorial jurisdiction is The Lotus Case (France v Turkey)
46
. In this 
judgment the Court asserted that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise 
its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention”
47
. The definition of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is consequently the exercise by a state of public functions over individuals located 
outside its own jurisdiction and beyond the traditional basis of domestic jurisdiction. In other 
words, the state tries to control the behavior of persons, acts or property outside its own territory. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction can occur in various situations. The most relevant versions to this 
purpose, are adjudicative and prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction. The former concerns 
situations where for example municipal criminal procedures add up to convictions for 
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extraterritorial unlawful acts, while the latter involves the adoption of legislation with the intention 




3.1.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and International Law 
 
Under international law there are a few bases generally recognized for the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. These bases consist of a combination of the prescriptive and the 
adjudicative theories, and the most important ones are the ‘effects’ doctrine of the ‘objective 
territoriality’ principle, the active and the passive personality principle (also known as the 
nationality principle), and the principle of universal jurisdiction
49
. The most relevant principles in 
this context are the principles of personality and universality.  
 
As maintained by the effects doctrine, states may enforce their jurisdiction over any action 
occurring anywhere provided that the said action possesses a negative effect upon the enforcing 
state. Due to the exercise of this jurisdiction municipal law will operate extraterritorially, often 
applied against foreign nationals. This principle has been subject to considerable criticism, and is 
not as widely acknowledged as the principle of personality. Respectively, according to the 
personality principle the nationality of the non-state actor in question can legitimize the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, both where the actor is the offender and where it is the victim. Under 
the principle of active personality a state can pass legislation, which applies, to its nationals and 
their conduct outside of its territory, while the passive personality principle enables a state to have 
jurisdiction over acts committed against its nationals, even when the act occurred abroad. In both 
situations the state implements its jurisdiction beyond its domestic territory and beyond the 
traditional scope of jurisdiction. In general the active personality principle is the one most 
acknowledged in the international sphere, although also the passive personality principle has gained 
a certain acceptance, especially where there is an adequate nationality link
50
. Nevertheless, such 
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised in conformity with the principle of reasonableness, 
if not, it may be regarded as a violation of the sovereignty of the territorial state. In particular, the 
active personality principle has been used as a justification for states to regulate the conduct of its 
national non-state actors abroad, and to ensure that they do not act in discrepancy with, for instance, 
fundamental human rights. Such regulation is applicable to both individuals and corporations 
operating abroad.  
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The principle of universal jurisdiction recognizes that some values are of so fundamental character 
that it is in the interest of the international community as a whole to protect them. This principle is 
of particular importance in regards to international criminal law and jus cogens crimes, but in recent 
times also certain customary norms have evolved under international human rights law and some of 
them have even gained status as peremptory norms of jus cogens
51
. Violations of such customary 
human rights law and jus cogens are violations of obligations erga omnes - to all other states and 
the international community as a whole - and accordingly any state may attempt to remedy the 
violation, even if the individual victim was not a national of that state and no other link between the 
state and the violation was proven
52
. In preventing violations of jus cogens norms a state is not 
regarded as pursuing its own interests, but rather as protecting the international community, thus, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is justified.  
 
However, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is subject to additional limitations. The first 
limitation which is imposed by international law is that the aforementioned acknowledged 
principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the “effects” doctrine, the personality principle and the 
principle of universality) must be practiced in accordance with the principle of reasonableness, as 
already stated above - in other words, it has to be determined if the state has applied one of the 
recognized principles in an acceptable manner. One important factor in determining the 
reasonableness of the extraterritorial jurisdiction is whether it primarily benefits the state, which 
exercises the jurisdiction by extending the range of its municipal legislation. If this is the case, then 
the conduct will not be regarded as “reasonable”. Secondly, the factual link between the state and 
the situation concerned must be sufficiently strong - the lack of a connecting link will make the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction unacceptable according to the principle of sovereignty and non-
intervention (except where extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of the universality 
principle). The last limitation generally imposed is that such jurisdiction is to be avoided where it 
would lead to interference with the internal affairs of the territorial state. As these limitations are of 
prevalent importance in general international law, the situation may nonetheless be somewhat 
different in the area of international human rights law. While exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction 
one should take into account the specific character of the situation one attempts to regulate. In a 
situation where a state attempts to secure the protection of human rights beyond its territorial 
borders, the conflicting arguments of state sovereignty and non-intervention is not as prominent as 
in general international law. Thus, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be justified; both on the basis of 
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the principle of active personality and universality, where a state attempts to protect internationally 
recognized human rights, whatever reason the territorial state may have to not effectively protect 
those rights itself. On this ground jurisdiction can neither be said to constitute an unlawful 
intervention in the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the territorial state. Besides, it is generally 
acknowledged that fundamental human rights, for instance those rights codified in the UDHR and 
the ICCPR, restrict the doctrine of state sovereignty and widen the scope of human rights 
obligations (this will be discussed under 3.1.2.) 
 
3.1.2 Expansion of the Territorial Scope of Human Rights Obligations  
 
The emergence of human rights law has challenged the traditional point of view reflected in the 
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. One can say that the international law of 
human rights is competing with these principles, and they are thus difficult to co-ordinate with each 
other
53
. Initially also the scope of human rights obligations was territorially defined, that is, that a 
state could be held responsible for breaches mainly within its own territory. Individuals were 
traditionally regarded as under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state of which they were inhabitants 
and nationals, and other states did not have the right to interfere with the authority of that state, 
even if it was unquestionable that human rights abuses occurred
54
. Nevertheless, a new conception 
slowly emerged, much because of the cruel and inhuman treatment of individuals and the gross 
human rights abuses which took place during the Second World War,. Article 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter
55
, which mirrors the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty of states, has been 
subject to reinterpretation in the area of international human rights law, so that such issues are no 
longer acknowledged as being merely within a state’s domestic jurisdiction. The United Nations 
also adopted a tendency to overrule the objection of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction in 
cases concerning human rights
56
, and accordingly also overruled the principle of non-intervention. 
Gradually, and as a consequence of the expanding number of international human rights 
instruments, the UN member states accepted the concept that intervention could be justified when 
serious and large-scale human rights violations allegedly had been committed. International human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies have to an increasing extent interpreted treaty obligations to having 
an extraterritorial scope, for instance Article 2 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
under where a state party are to respect and ensure the covenant rights “to all individuals within its 
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territory and subject to its jurisdiction”. Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that 
under the ICCPR “persons may fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of a State party even when 




Thus, a state’s human rights obligations are not limited to its territory, but are extended to be 
applicable to all individuals who are subject to its jurisdiction. Such an expansion is expressly 
stated in both ACHR Article 1(1) and ECHR Article 1. It is also assumed that the ICESCR applies 
to a state’s jurisdiction even though it lacks a jurisdictional clause
58
. In Victor Saldano v Argentina  
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that according to Article 1 (1) of the ACHR 
a state party could “be responsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its 
agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that state’s territory”
59
. A similar statement 
was made by the European Court of Human Rights in Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, 
where it confirmed that “the term “jurisdiction” is not limited to the national territory of the High 
Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authorities 
producing effects outside their own territory”
60
. Accordingly, if jurisdiction can be established, 
extraterritorial human rights obligations may potentially arise
61
. To establish jurisdiction it has to be 
proved that the violating acts were in fact within the power, authority or effective control of the 
state. In the judgment of Loizidou v Turkey the ECHR found that “the respondent Government have 
acknowledged that the applicant’s loss of control of her property stems from the occupation of the 
northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment there of the “TRNC” ... It follows 
that such acts are capable of falling within Turkish “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 
(1) of the Convention”
62
. The Court, thus, held Turkey responsible on the ground that Turkey had 
effective or overall control over the armed forces outside its domestic territory. Also subsequent 
jurisprudence of the ECHR and the ICJ have adopted a similar wide understanding of the scope of 
jurisdiction
63
. For instance, in Advisory Opinion on the Wall the ICJ found the ICCPR to be 
applicable “in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory”
64
, a statement which was later confirmed in its judgment in Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda where Ugandan military forces violated human rights within the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo
65
.  
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The jurisprudence cited above is in conformity with the objects and purposes of a state’s human 
rights obligations. The international law of human rights is developed with the intention of 
protecting individuals against arbitrary violence and abuse, without regard to the location where the 
abusive conduct occurs
66
. Consequently, extraterritorial acts can be found to lay within the 
jurisdiction of a state if they were exercised by someone within the power, control or authority of 
the state. A state is, hence, under the obligation to respect and protect human rights both within and 
outside of its domestic territory - the protection of human rights does not merely relate to the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the territorial state. Additionally, in regards to the principles of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction cited above under 2.1.2, the territorial scope of a state’s jurisdiction is 
broadened under international human rights law compared to general international law, so that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may be justified where it was exercised in order to protect human rights 
beyond domestic borders. It has also been perceived that as the protection of human rights is of 
interest to all states and the whole international community, the factual link between the state and 
the particular human rights violation do not have to be as obvious as under general international law 
for the state to be allowed to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction according to the active personality 
principle. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to protect recognized human rights 
can neither be considered as not being in conformity with the principle of non-intervention, as 
human rights law cannot be understood as being an exclusive matter of the domestic jurisdiction of 
the territorial state.  
 
3.2. State Responsibility and the Extraterritorial Acts of Corporate Nationals 
 
As already established above, a state may under the general law of state responsibility be held 
responsible for actions committed by non-state actors. Such responsibility can arise when the non-
state actor acted under the instructions, directions or control of the state, or when the state has failed 
to exercise the reasonable due diligence required in accordance with the state’s duty to protect 
international human rights. Furthermore, responsibility may occur as a result of conduct outside of 
the state’s domestic jurisdiction as the scope of international obligations is not restricted to its 
domestic territory, especially in regards to the international law on human rights. Hence, the 
following question is whether or not the conduct of non-state actors operating abroad may add up to 
state responsibility, and on what grounds this responsibility is justified. This is a question of 
growing importance, in particular because of the increase of extraterritorial activities of 
multinational corporations and their ability to violate human rights. Usually a state does not 
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intentionally allow its corporate nationals to violate international human rights standards in their 
activities abroad, but the state may nevertheless unconsciously contribute to such abuses, for 
instance by the lack of effectively exercising the duty to protect human rights.  
 
In the following sections focus will primarily be upon the principle of due diligence in regards to a 
state’s duty to protect its human rights obligations, and whether this doctrine can be used as an 
instrument to establish state responsibility for possible extraterritorial human rights violations 
committed by multinational corporations. Secondly, it will also be examined whether the traditional 
law of state responsibility as codified in the ILC Articles can justify the attribution of extraterritorial 
acts of corporate nationals to the home state, and thus invoke home state responsibility.  
 
3.2.1. Home State Responsibility 
 
In this further discussion it is necessary to differentiate between the home state and the host state in 
which the multinational corporation is operating. In the era of globalization there has been a great 
expansion and growth within the area of corporations acting transnationally, and this has been and 
still is a considerable challenge and threat to the protection of internationally recognized human 
rights. One important aspect of this is the problem regarding the nationality of the corporation 
operating abroad, that is, whether it is to be seen as a national of its host state or its home state and 
accordingly which one of those states that are to be held responsible for eventual internationally 
unlawful acts. In this context the host state is the state in which the multinational corporation 
actually operates, while the home state is defined as the state in which its headquarters or parent 
company are based. Traditionally, as already noted above, state responsibility only accrued where 
the unlawful act occurred within the state’s jurisdiction. In addition the duty to protect human rights 
was held to be governed by the principle of territoriality, so that the duty only was applied within a 
state’s domestic boundaries. Hence, the question is if, and on what conditions, the home state of the 
multinational corporation can be held responsible for human rights violations which occurred in the 
host state, and which additionally were committed by the corporate national’s foreign subsidiary. If 
such unlawful acts committed by non-state actors outside the state’s territory are imputed to the 
state and thus responsibility is confirmed, then the doctrine of state responsibility is stretched far 
beyond its traditional scope.  
 
3.2.1.1 The Recognition of Home State Responsibility in International Law 
 
  21 
Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR, which contains the state duty to protect human rights, provides that this 
duty is to be applied by the state to all individuals “within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction”, and similar statements are present in several regional and international human rights 
conventions. However, it has been argued that this conventional view is no longer supreme in this 
area of law, and thus that states are obliged not only to protect human rights within its domestic 
territory, but also outside territorial boundaries. The doctrine of home state responsibility is 
essential in this context, much because of the current lack of regulatory regimes to hold 
multinational corporations directly responsible for human rights violations. On the other hand, an 
efficient doctrine of home state responsibility is also desirable on the grounds that it may 
compensate for the deficient, and in some cases the total lack of, host state regulation and protection 
of human rights. Host state regulation is in many circumstances ineffective, both because of the 
power of the corporation and the state’s lack of resources and capabilities to regulate it.  
 
There are in current international law two options which have to be considered regarding the 
question whether or not home state responsibility may arise. Primarily, one has to examine whether 
extraterritorial acts of non-state actors may be imputed to the state on the basis of the ILC Articles, 
particularly article 5, article 8 and article 16. Secondly, it must be considered if the principle of due 
diligence in accordance with the duty to protect human rights is applicable to such situations, and if 
it is a sufficient base for home state responsibility to accrue. The enactment of home state 
responsibility is a controversial topic under international law, mainly because of the predominant 
roles of the doctrines of state sovereignty and non-intervention, and the unwillingness of states to 
decrease the scope of these doctrines. Moreover, a common argument by states to deny 
responsibility for violations abroad by their corporate nationals is that these matters primarily 
concerns the host state, that is on the territory where the corporation operates
67
. However, the 
principle of home state responsibility may prove to play a significant role in ensuring that private 
actors such as multinational corporations do not violate human rights in the country where they 
operate, in particular developing countries.  
 
According to the general law of state responsibility, home states are mainly not held liable for the 
misconduct of their corporate nationals operating abroad. A reason for this may be that a state’s 
domestic boundaries are seen as a limitation to the establishment of state responsibility in the 
context of private violations of international human rights standards. It has been argued that a state 
is not obliged through the current international human rights conventions to control the activities of 
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its nationals outside its domestic territory, this in compliance with the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction. The territorial location is thus considered to be the main approach to invoke state 
responsibility, but also alternative approaches have eventually gained certain recognition
68
. As a 
consequence violations of private actors occurring outside the traditional territorial jurisdiction may 
give rise to international responsibility. Such responsibility is, however, possible only where the 
international obligation of the state is to control a specific activity, and not where the obligation is 
to control a certain territorial area. An additional condition is that the state has the sufficient 
competence and capabilities to exercise the control required even when the violations are occurring 
outside its domestic jurisdiction, this is in accordance both with the principle of due diligence and 
the interpretations of the ILC Articles. As a result, the argument commonly used by states regarding 
the legal supremacy of the territorial state as a shield to invoke home state responsibility, is not one 
of crucial substance. This is largely because the decisive factor in establishing state responsibility 
on this basis is whether or not the state really was or was able to exercise effective control of the 
corporate activities, and it is therefore irrelevant where the unlawful acts actually took place. 
Because of the complexity of many multinational corporations, the home state is often more capable 
of effectively controlling their operations than the host states, for instance by implementing 
regulatory regimes within its own legislation and hence influencing and directing the conduct of the 
multinational corporation abroad. Consequently, as host state responsibility has its legal foundation 
in the principle of territoriality, which is fundamental in the international law of state responsibility, 
home state responsibility must on its part be based on an alternative jurisdictional ground. There are 
two possible foundations, that is, the principle of active personality and the principle of universality. 
Moreover, these jurisdictional foundations have to be regarded in connection with the 
aforementioned principle of due diligence and the ILC Articles.  
 
3.2.1.2 Home State Responsibility and the Principle of Due Diligence 
 
The principle of due diligence is, as stated above, derived from the state’s duty to protect human 
rights. Furthermore, the duty to protect is interpreted into several both regional and international 
human rights conventions. Accordingly, the principle of due diligence and the state responsibility 
which may accrue from the failure to exercise such reasonable due diligence, is well acknowledged 
in international human rights law. However, the applicability of this doctrine to extraterritorial acts 
has proven to be rather controversial, and the opinions on this topic are diverse. It has for instance 
been argued that the only possibility for home state responsibility to arise is on the ground of the 
ILC Articles, and that the principle of due diligence is applicable exclusively to situations which 
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take place within a state’s own domestic territory
69
. On the other hand, analysis of jurisprudence in 
the European human rights context have demonstrated that “the evolution of the doctrine in the field 
of State responsibility leads to the conclusion that even if the principle of territoriality is still 
implicit for the notion of due diligence, there is a certain “delocation” of the infraction that can 
entail the responsibility of the State”
70
. Thus, it is claimed that the principle of due diligence is not 
entirely dependent on the actual territorial location, and that extraterritorial application may, on 
reasonable grounds, be acceptable. 
 
Before any further specific discussion on whether the principle of due diligence can be used as a 
means to invoke state responsibility for extraterritorial acts of multinational corporations, it is 
necessary to examine the explicit state obligations which this principle entails. In the light of the 
ILC Articles and the clarifications of the law of state responsibility, it is suggested that the nature of 
the due diligence obligation is to be determined by the basic primary rules of international law, and 
not the secondary rules of state responsibility. The central characteristic of the duty to protect, 
which is a primary obligation of human rights law, is that it is a standard of conduct, and not a 
standard of result. Accordingly, state responsibility is not invoked because of the human rights 
abuse as such. Instead responsibility arises because of the state’s failure to take appropriate and 
reasonable steps to the prevention and protection of the specific violation, which is in itself a breach 
of an international obligation. Ergo, the breach is not a consequence of a positive act, but rather the 
consequence of an omission. How to fulfill the duty within the parameters of reasonable and 
appropriate prevention and protection, is generally subject to the state’s discretion. Anyhow, the 
treaty monitoring bodies under the central United Nations human rights conventions ordinarily 
recommend state parties to adopt all necessary measures to protect and prevent against abuse by 
non-state actors. A common conception is nonetheless that the exact requirements of how to 
properly exercise due diligence may vary depending on the primary obligation in question
71
, and 
also according to the specific state and its abilities to actually prevent the particular abuse. Unlike 
where state responsibility is invoked as a result of the imputability of non-state behavior to the state 
(as in compliance with the ILC Articles and its rules on attribution), responsibility as a result of the 
failure to exercise due diligence is only dependent on the state’s separate delict or omission - the 
state is not responsible for the actions of the individual as if they were the state’s own, and there is 
no question of imputability of the unlawful act to the state. As a result, responsibility does not occur 
every time there has been an infringement of a human right, but it is rather invoked by the omission 
to prevent the infringement where the state reasonably could have prevented it. The European Court 
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of Human Rights in Case of Mastromatteo v Italy illustrates this point of view. In this case the 
alleged violation concerned Article 2 and the right to life, and the applicant claimed that the state 
had failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. The Court rejected the complaint and 
hence affirmed that “not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention 
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. A positive 
obligation will arise, the Court has held, where it has been established that the authorities knew or 
ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to 
avoid that risk”
72
. This articulation of the Court is furthermore in conformity with the judgment in 
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras which, as mentioned under 2.1.2, was the first case to emphasize 
the existence and importance of the principle of due diligence. The European Court has addressed 
the question of positive obligations of states in various contexts, and it has declared that the treaty 
obligations includes “the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves”
73
. Also the African Commission on 
Human Rights has adopted the due diligence test. In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v 
Zimbabwe, which concerned Article 1 of the African Charter, the Commission examined the scope 
of the principle and when it could be applied to invoke state responsibility. One important aspect of 
the test was if the state could have foreseen the violations and thus if it was reasonable to expect the 
state to prevent them. Accordingly, the question that had to be addressed was whether “the state 
took the necessary measures to prevent violations from happening at all, or having realised 
violations had taken place, took steps to ensure the protection of the rights of the victims”
74
. In 
determining whether the state action met the due diligence requirements the Commission also 
considered the seriousness of the efforts the state undertook to protect the rights. Additionally, the 
Commission held, for the first time, that the duty to protect applies to the protection against abuse 
committed by all non-state actors, including corporations. The Commission also discussed the 
extent of a state’s responsibility. It was argued that the extent was to be determined on the grounds 
of the specific circumstances of the case and the rights violated, and that the test of due diligence 
can not be regulated by abstract and generalized rules. The Commission thus referred to the 
International Court of Justice and that it had previously determined due diligence “in terms of 
“means of disposal” of the state”. Nonetheless, the Commission maintained, “this need not be 
inconsistent with maintaining some minimum requirements. It could well be assumed that for non-
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derogable
75
 human rights the positive obligations of states would go further than in other areas”
76
. 
One may presume, from these positions adopted by the Commission, that where a state is accused 
of not sufficiently preventing human rights violations, it must be shown that the state could have 
anticipated the harm. Moreover, if the state in a serious manner attempted to fulfill its duties, it is 
likely to pass the due diligence test. Another aspect of substantial significance in deciding whether 
the requirements of due diligence is met, is the nature of the rights of the alleged violation. The test 
of state compliance with the duty to protect is more stringent with reference to the most 
fundamental, and as stated by the African Commission, the non-derogable, human rights (which 
among others includes the right to freedom from torture). It is therefore more likely that state 
responsibility because of the failure to exercise the reasonable due diligence is invoked as a result 
of violations of such fundamental, non-derogable human rights. Anyhow, the leading conception is 
that the reasonableness or the seriousness of the measures adopted by the state is crucial in 
determining compliance by the state with the duty to protect human rights, a point of view which is 
supported by the jurisprudence of both the Inter-American and the European Court of Human 
Rights. Ergo, state responsibility may be invoked by non-state actors when they violate human 
rights, if the state has failed to take reasonable or serious measures to prevent or respond to the 
violations, a theory which is in conformity with the definition of due diligence as “a flexible 
reasonableness standard adaptable to particular facts and circumstances”
77
. Additionally, where the 
primary rules of international law impose a due diligence standard of conduct upon the state, “then 
the nature of the rights and interests at issue, as well as a number of other factors, will determine 




The analysis above shows that state responsibility can accrue as a result of international human 
rights violations committed by non-state actors within the state’s domestic jurisdiction, and that the 
state is obliged to control such private entities so that violations do not occur, both under regional 
and universal human rights treaties. Ergo, it is not disputed that the host state of a multinational 
corporation is under the obligation to exercise due diligence to protect human rights in the 
municipal sphere by controlling and regulating corporate conduct. On the other side, as the home 
state of a multinational corporation often is in a better position to regulate its activities and 
operations abroad than the host state, then the failure to control these activities may give rise to the 
international responsibility of the home state where the activities result in violations of human 
rights. If such home state regulation of private entities operating outside the state’s territory can be 
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regarded as a binding obligation upon the state, a legal basis for state responsibility for 
extraterritorial human rights violations is established. Traditionally the assumption was that the 
principle of due diligence was territorially confined, and that international human rights law did not 
impose any general obligations on states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect and 
promote human rights outside their domestic territories
79
. It has been argued that state responsibility 
invoked by an omission to regulate acts of non-state actors which resulted in deficient protection of 
other private persons, has only been accepted in situations falling under the jurisdiction of the state, 
that is, where the state actually exercises effective control. As it is normally not assumed that a state 
exercises such control outside its domestic boundaries, it may prove difficult to justify a broadening 
of the scope of the positive obligations, which are derived from international human rights treaties. 
Thus, it is argued, that “a clear obligation for States to control private actors such as corporations, 
operating outside their national territory, in order to ensure that these actors will not violate human 
rights of others, has not crystallized yet”.  
 
But, as pointed to above, the recognition of the extraterritorial dimension of the principle is 
increasing
80
, much because of the aforementioned problems regarding the regulation of 
multinational corporations, and the classical view of territoriality may be changing. It is for instance 
acknowledged that state parties to the ICESCR have extraterritorial obligations, and this 
extraterritorial obligation may in some circumstances include an obligation to regulate the 
operations of their corporate nationals
81
. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights indicated that “State parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other 
countries, and prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to 
influence third parties by way of legal or political means”
82
. The duty to protect under the ICESCR 
has also been interpreted as to include “an obligation for the state to ensure that all other bodies 
subject to its control (such as transnational corporations based in that state) respect the enjoyment of 
rights in other countries”
83
 (p 22). Hence, if any of the rights under the ICESCR are violated by a 
state’s corporate national in another state, or by the eventual corporate national’s foreign subsidiary, 
the home state may be considered to be ‘under an obligation to regulate, investigate and even bring 
before the courts conduct of a transnational corporation under its home state jurisdiction where a 
‘threshold of gravity’ of human rights violations is at stake’. Similarly, where the home state has 
adequate knowledge of the extraterritorial activities of its corporate nationals and foreign 
subsidiaries and, thus, knowledge of the possible human rights impact in the host state, the home 
                                                
79
 De Schutter, Olivier, Chapter IV, section 2.1.  
80
 McCorquodale, Robert & Simons, Penelope p 21.  
81
 McCorquodale, Robert & Simons, Penelope p 22.  
82
 UN General Comment No. 14 (2000).  
83
 McCorquodale, Robert & Simons, Penelope p 22.  
  27 
state may be obliged ‘to prevent and mitigate the risk by adopting legislation to this end. A failure 
to do so would amount to a breach of the international obligation to exercise due diligence, for 
which international responsibility arises’. This assumption is supported by the jurisdictional 
principle of active personality, of where a state has the competence to exercise jurisdiction and pass 
legislation, which applies, to its nationals even when they are operating abroad. The home state of 
where the parent company is based is for this reason authorized under international law to indirectly 
regulate a foreign subsidiary which the parent company owns or controls, by implementing 
municipal legislation which binds the parent company and accordingly requires it to impose an 
express course of action on its subsidiaries. On the other hand, a common problem in regards to the 
multinational corporation is the separation of legal personalities and the internationalized 
organization of their activities, and the restrictions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Usually the parent 
company and the subsidiary are considered as two separate legal entities
84
, and the home state of the 
parent company will typically be incompetent or reluctant to regulate corporate activity abroad and 
thus exercising a form of jurisdiction, which is generally not acknowledged under international law. 
Nonetheless, as the parent corporation is considered to be a national of the home state, the 
regulation of that company or any subsidiaries which the company controls is in principle also 
justified under the active personality principle, in particular where the regulation “addresses the 
parent company, rather than its foreign subsidiaries directly”
85
. Anyhow, as mentioned, a state’s 
constructive knowledge of potential human rights violations may additionally engage an obligation 
upon the state to exercise reasonable due diligence to prevent abuses, and not just the liberty to do 
so. There is also a tendency within the area of human rights law to acknowledge the need of binding 
obligations so that states may exercise its jurisdiction in extraterritorial situations, and, 





It has been contended that there are at least two different circumstances in which the constructive 
knowledge of the state entails an obligation to exercise due diligence
87
 . Primarily, the obligation is 
engaged where a corporate national invests in conflict zones, failed states or repressive regimes. 
Under such circumstances the host state itself is often incapable of or unwilling to protect 
international human rights standards, and, thus, it is more likely for the multinational corporation to 
be complicit in abuses. In these situations the home state cannot in good faith claim that it was 
unaware of the potential risks, and that it consequently was under no obligation to protect human 
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rights. Such an omission to fulfill its international duties will potentially invoke state responsibility 
on the basis of the failure to exercise reasonable due diligence. Secondly, an obligation to exercise 
due diligence engaged by the constructive knowledge of the state, may be invoked where the home 
state can be regarded as assisting the progress of extraterritorial abuse committed by a corporate 
national or through its subsidiaries. This situation will include the case of bilateral investment 
treaties between a multinational corporation and a developing state. A general problem of these 
agreements is that they ordinarily constitute great protections for the corporate national’s investors, 
and that they additionally may restrict the host state’s abilities to regulate the subsidiaries to ensure 
that their operations are in conformity with the state’s human rights obligations. The agreements do 
usually neither impose any obligations on the foreign investors to respect the human rights in the 
host state. It is therefore argued that, “in restricting the host state’s capacity to regulate foreign 
investment through such agreements, home states cannot then maintain that it is the obligation of 
the host state to ensure that subsidiaries of foreign TNCs [multinational corporations] do not violate 
international human rights standards”
88
. In regards to these two situations, even though the unlawful 
acts are not directly imputable to the home state, it is argued that the home state “exercises 
sufficient control over the parent company and has constructive knowledge of the potential of the 
subsidiary to violate human rights law to justify the imposition of an obligation to exercise due 
diligence in relation to the human rights impacts of such activity”
89
. As admitted above, state 
responsibility may accrue on the ground of violations of international human rights obligations 
committed by non-state actors within the domestic jurisdiction, and under some circumstances the 
state is obliged to regulate the operations of private entities outside its territory. The result of these 
two conclusions is that a multinational corporation may, although operating outside the territory of 
its home state, invoke state responsibility if the outcome of these operations is human rights 
violations. State responsibility may thus be invoked if the the state did not attempt to prevent the 
activities or if the measures were inadequate or contrary to its human rights obligations, and the 
state is accordingly in breach of its due diligence obligation, although the outcome is dependent on 
the requirement of effective or sufficient control and knowledge. This duty to exercise due diligence 
would necessarily require the home state to take all reasonable measures to ensure that its corporate 
nationals do not violate international human rights law, even when the unlawful activities are 
administered by a foreign subsidiary, for example by implementing domestic legislation which 
directly regulates corporate activity.  
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Even though the theoretical conclusion is that state responsibility may be invoked by extraterritorial 
acts of private entities, the implementation of it in practice can prove to be problematic as several 
limitations to the doctrine of home state responsibility are imposed by general international law. A 
great deal of these problems is derived from the prevailing and fundamental principles of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention, and the efficacy of the principle of home state responsibility is 
thus constrained. Such difficulties can become apparent in a number of ways, and many factors are 
involved. For instance, most states are ordinarily unwilling to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
order to regulate and control the activities of their corporate nationals. Home states, in particular, do 
often hesitate to regulate corporate activity because it can place the corporation in a situation of 
disadvantage in the host state, especially where there is a lack of similar regulatory regimes 
imposed on competing corporations. Also, with regards to multinational corporations, the 
identification of the parent company or the corporation’s nationality may be difficult as the 
organization of such corporations is often complex. Hence, identifying the correct home state is not 
always unproblematic. One can neither ignore the powerful role of many multinational corporations 
and the obstacles this may constitute. The most apparent and sensitive controversy is, nonetheless, 
the conflict and discrepancy between the principle of home state responsibility and the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. All states are obliged to respect the sovereignty of other states by not intervening 
in their internal affairs, for example by respecting the restrictions of the general rules of jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, “subjecting private actors operating abroad to legislation of the home state often 
meets with resistance from host states alleging infringement of the principle of state sovereignty”
90
. 
This objection is however easily repudiated due to the notion that extraterritoriality is justified 
under the jurisdictional principle of active personality as referred to above, of which a state is 
entitled to implement legislation which binds its nationals in their activities outside of the state’s 
domestic boundaries.   
 
Whether or not there currently exists an obligation of a state to exercise due diligence to protect 
human rights threatened by non-state actors outside of its domestic territory and how wide the scope 
of the obligation is, is not yet unanimously settled in international law, but the potential risks and 
abuse which are imposed by the activities of transnational actors can in any case not be ignored. 
Also, the international community is in lack of an effective legal regime to regulate and address 
such activities, and the need of such an efficient system is growing. Within the municipal legal 
sphere there has been a tendency of increasing extraterritorial application of domestic legislation in 
order to attempt to regulate the operations of corporations abroad
91
. Anyhow, as stated by the 
                                                
90
 Chirwa, Danwood Mzikenge, Chapter VI, section D.  
91
 Danailov, Silvia p 24.  
  30 
Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission of Human Rights regarding economic, social and 
cultural rights, “the violations committed by the transnational corporations in their mainly 
transboundary activities do not come within the competence of a single State and, to prevent 
contradictions and inadequacies in the remedies and sanctions decided upon by States individually 
or as a group, these violations should form the subject of special attention. The States and the 
international community should combine their efforts so as to contain such activities by the 
establishment of legal standards capable of achieving that objective”
92
. Under the law of state 
responsibility one may consider the principle of due diligence to be of significant importance as it 
can be applied to various facts and circumstances, and also to different areas of international law 
(for instance international humanitarian law and international environmental law). It has also been 
referred to as a “basic principle of international law”
93
. However, the scope of the principle of due 
diligence in relation to state responsibility and international human rights law, is still not settled 
when it comes to extraterritorial human rights violations by non-state actors, and it remains a 
question of major importance for the international community to determine. 
 
3.2.1.3 Home State Responsibility and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
 
As confirmed above in the analysis under 2.2.1, the actions of non-state actors are, under certain 
circumstances, imputable to the state, and the law of state responsibility is also relevant in the 
context of international human rights law. According to the rules of state responsibility laid down in 
the ILC Articles there are three possibilities for the attribution of acts committed by a state’s 
corporate nationals so as to give rise to international responsibility of that state. Article 5 affirms 
that responsibility may arise where a state empowers a corporation to exercise elements of public 
authority, while attribution of conduct is justified under article 8 where a corporation acts on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, a state. Distinction is thus made between 
responsibility for empowered bodies and bodies under state control. It has been claimed that acts 
falling under these categories are imputable to the state also when they were committed outside of 
the state’s territorial boundaries
94
. In addition, it is contended, also article 16 which concerns state 
complicity in an unlawful act committed by a corporation, can invoke such state responsibility.  
 
At first, responsibility on the basis of article 5 will be examined. The position expressed in article 5 
is that “the conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which 
is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
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considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance”
95
. The Commentary explains that the intention of the article is, 
among others, to attempt to regulate situations “where former State corporations have been 
privatized but retain certain pubic or regulatory functions”
96
. For attribution of conduct to take place 
it must be proved that “the conduct of the entity relates to the exercise of the governmental 
authority concerned”, and not to private or commercial activities. The decisive criteria is therefore 
whether or not the corporation is in fact empowered by the government, no matter if it is limited to 
a particular extent or context. The degree of ownership of the corporation by the state, for instance, 
is not crucial for the purpose of attribution of conduct. The scope of governmental authority is not 
finally settled, although it is maintained that article 5 covers situations where the corporation’s 
‘exercise of authority involves an independent discretion or power to act; there is no need to show 
that the conduct was in fact carried out under the control of the State’ - in other words; article 5 is 
97
also applicable to acts committed ultra vires. According to the General Assembly and statements 
from various governments it is apparent that the rule derived from this article is considered “as 
reflecting the current approach of international law to this topic”
98
. Consequently, imputability of 
extraterritorial acts is justified because of the actual authorized conduct.  
 
Article 8, on the other hand, affirms that private conduct is to be imputed to the state if it was 
carried out “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State”, a category, which 
is said to be less narrow than the one of article 5
99
. In the Commentary the general principle of the 
law of state responsibility is repeated, namely that private conduct is usually not imputable to the 
state. However, under certain circumstances “conduct is nevertheless attributable to the State 
because there exists a specific factual relationship between the person or entity engaging in the 
conduct and the State”
100
. The two circumstances involve, accordingly, acts by non-state actors 
under the instructions of the state, and activities committed under the state’s direction or control. 
While responsibility as a result of authorized conduct has gained broad recognition under 
international law, imputability on the basis of the second option; direction or control, is still more 
controversial and difficult to confirm. It is claimed that attribution on this ground is justified “only 
if it [the state] directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an 
integral part of that operation”
101
, attribution is thus dependent “on the extent of the state’s control 
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over the corporation’s extraterritorial activities”
102
. As referred to above under section 2.2.1., the 
degree of control necessary to justify attribution of conduct to the state was explicitly reviewed in 
the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, where a test for control 
was articulated. According to this test a situation of ordinary dependence and support would be 
inadequate to legitimize attribution, however, the judgment has subsequently been subject to 
considerable criticism because of its strict requirements and high threshold. For instance, it has been 
assumed that the explicit degree of control is subject to the circumstances and interests of the 
particular case, and that a less strict threshold is to be applied in the case of violations of 
fundamental human rights. The Commentary furthermore explicitly addresses the question of 
attribution of corporate conduct to the state. It finds that, even though a corporation is considered as 
a separate legal entity under international law, “a State may, either by specific directions or by 
exercising control over a group, in effect assume responsibility for their conduct”
103
. With the 
increasing international tendency of which states use corporations in their extraterritorial activities, 
such as military operations and international trade, there is also a growing possibility of 
corporations breaching international law and hence an extended chance of attribution of private 
conduct to the state. Thus, it is asserted, that “where such activities violate international human 
rights law, the state will incur international responsibility, including those situations where the 
corporation contravenes instructions”
104
. This assertion is in conformity with the opinion of the 
Commentary of which “the condition for attribution will still be met even if particular instructions 
may have been ignored”
105
. The conduct will nevertheless have been committed under the state’s 
control, and is therefore imputable to the state under article 8.  
 
Eventually, the option of state complicity in internationally unlawful acts as means of attribution is 
explored. Under Chapter IV of Part One the ILC Articles, which covers article 16, state 
responsibility is invoked for the unlawful act committed by another state. This kind of responsibility 
can be regarded as an exception from the basic principles of where each state is responsible for its 
own conduct, and the Commentary defines such situations as extraordinary and “exceptions to the 
principle of independent responsibility”
106
. The proposition in article 16 is that any state “which 
aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful by the latter is 
internationally responsible for doing so if: a) that State does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and b) the act would be internationally wrongful 
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if committed by that State”. Although the direct application of article 16 merely affects situations 
where the state itself through its state organs is aiding or assisting an unlawful act which is 
committed by another state, the proposition that only states may invoke responsibility is not 
exclusive. A home state may be complicit in the extraterritorial operations of its corporate nationals 
by aiding and assisting the corporate activity, and if the operations result in breaches of 
international law home state responsibility could be incurred. Consequently, “where a home state 
aids or assists a corporation in the commission of, or in the latter’s complicity in, acts that, if 
committed by that home state would constitute internationally wrongful acts, that state will incur 
international responsibility, at least where the aid or assistance “contributed significantly to that 
act””
107
, and the aid or assistance do not necessarily have to “have been essential to the performance 
of the internationally wrongful act”
108
. Nonetheless, it is expressed in the Commentary that for a 
state to be held responsible for facilitating violations of human rights, it must be determined that the 





It is thus, on the basis of the ILC Articles, assumed that home state responsibility may be invoked 
as a result of a corporate national’s extraterritorial operations where such operations violate 
international human rights. Home state responsibility can arise where, in its extraterritorial acts, the 
corporation exercised elements of governmental authority, and where it was acting under the 
instructions, direction or control of the home state. Additionally, home state responsibility can 
occur where the home state was aiding or assisting an unlawful act committed by the host state in 
relation to the operations of the home state’s corporate national or its subsidiary, and where home 
state complicity in extraterritorial breaches of international law committed by a corporate national 
or its subsidiary can be proved. Under these circumstances the internationally unlawful conduct of 
the corporation is attributed to the home state. Such rules of attribution are for the most part 
theoretically assessed, and actual situations have so far mainly arisen before the European Court of 
Human Rights in cases regarding and corporal punishment in private schools and airport noise. But 
still it is contended that these principles of imputability are “likely to become a primary means for 




Attribution of conduct founded on these rules is, along with the principle of due diligence, in 
conformity with the jurisdictional principle of active personality. Where the nationality of the 
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corporation is identified the home state is accordingly legitimized to control its extraterritorial 
operations by implementing municipal regulation, which is binding upon it. Anyhow, another 
question is whether human rights violations committed by a corporate national’s foreign subsidiary 
abroad can invoke home state responsibility. This question may, however, be answered in the 
affirmative on the ground of a state’s obligation to exercise reasonable due diligence in order to 
protect human rights and regulate the activities of the foreign subsidiaries, and it can also be 
justified in situations where the state was complicit in the violating acts by offering aids or 
assistance.  
 
4 Concluding Observations   
 
One of the principal aims of this article was to examine how the system of international law and 
international human rights law can effectively address challenges, which are imposed by the 
transnational activities of non-state actors. It is not disputed that the primary obligation of states 
under human rights law to protect human rights can incur state responsibility, and the reliance on 
the responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill human rights has increased correspondingly
111
. 
Additionally, it is considered that these three types of state obligations are applicable to all 
internationally recognized human rights, and that they are not restricted to the rights protected by 
the ICESCR. The position that human rights obligations can arouse state responsibility is widely 
acknowledged in regard to the omission of a state to protect human rights within its domestic 
territory, both by regional and international human rights treaty bodies, but it is also asserted that 
the duty has extraterritorial effects. Besides, also some of the rules deduced from the ILC Articles 
can be interpreted as to justify the attribution of extraterritorial private conduct to a state. Yet the 
topic is one of controversy and the international legal framework in regard to the regulation of 
private actors is not sufficiently developed, nor is the content satisfactorily settled. It is for instance 
asserted “current guidance from the [Human Rights] Committees suggests that the treaties do not 
require States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over business abuse. But nor are they 
prohibited from doing so. International law permits a State to exercise such jurisdiction provided 
there is a recognized basis: where the actor or victim is a national, where the acts have substantial 




Legal mechanisms for imputing human rights responsibilities to non-state actors are still 
developing. For an effective international protection of human rights it is necessary to develop a 
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legal regime, which directly imposes clear obligations and responsibilities on the multinational 
corporations themselves, as a system exclusively addressed to states has proven to be inadequate in 
the current state of international law. But until multinational corporations can be held directly 
legally accountable for their human rights violations, the principles of state responsibility and due 
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